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 Abstract 
The unexpected outbreak of asylum seekers in the recent years set multiple 
challenging tasks to be fulfilled. We focus our analysis on the challenges the 
European Union, as a conglomerate of countries willing to provide the 
immediate cares to these masses, faces when welcoming a great number of 
refugees into its population.  
The European Union has suffered a considerable increase in its share of older 
population which results in a meaningful pressure on the welfare systems (and 
on the population in general) of multiple MS. The refugee surge appears as a 
favourable event on this matter as it is mainly characterized by an influx of 
population aged between 16 and 65 years of age. 
When reviewing the literature on immigration, we find that in several past 
experiences the immigration of workforce, specifically from population fleeing 
war or political conflicts, resulted in a significant economic growth for the host 
region/country. 
The swift integration of refugees is a key drive to assure the well-functioning 
of the labour market and inherently, of the labour market conditions that regard 
the native population. 
The major challenges that the EU face both in the short and in the medium-
long run are also addressed in this thesis, and the most proeminent challenge, 
that concerns the cost the member states incur when accepting the refugees in 
their countries, appears as succesfully completed as the influx of asylum seekers 
already reached its climax and are expected to decrease in the upcoming years. 
 
Keywords: Refugee, European Union, challenges, integration.  
 Resumo 
O surto inesperado de requerentes de asilo dos últimos anos resultou em 
vários desafios exigentes para serem cumpridos. A nossa análise foca-senos 
desafios que a União Europeia, como um aglomerado de países dispostos a 
oferecer os cuidados imediatos a estas massas, enfrenta, ao acolher um grande 
número de refugiados na sua população. 
A União Europeia sofreu um aumento considerável na sua população idosa 
que resulta numa pressão substancial nos sistemas de proteção social (e na 
população em geral) dos diversos estados membros. O surto de refugiados 
apresenta-se como um evento favorável neste âmbito caracterizando-se, 
maioritariamente, por um influxo de população na faixa etária dos 16 aos 65 anos 
de idade. 
Ao revermos a literatura sobre a imigração, concluímos que em diversas 
experiências passadas a imigração de mão de obra, especialmente devido a 
guerras ou conflitos políticos, resultou num significante crescimento económico 
no país anfitrião. 
A rápida integração dos refugiados é um fator crucial para assegurar o bom 
funcionamento do mercado de trabalho e, consequentemente, das condições da 
população nativa no mercado de trabalho. 
Os maiores desafios que a União Europeia enfrenta acurto e a médio-longo 
prazo, são também abordados nesta tese, sendo o desafio mais proeminente, o 
custo incorrido pelos estados membros ao receber um grande número de 
refugiados, demonstrando-se como cumprido e bem-sucedido, visto que o 
influxo de refugiados já atingiu o seu clímax e é esperado que diminua nos 
próximos anos. 
Palavras-chave: Refugiado, União Europeia, desafios, integração 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
It is a known fact that the EU is in-need of working population in the economy. 
The baby-boom generation from the 50s and 60s, the extended life expectancy of 
nowadays, and the low fertility rates of many MS results in demographic 
tendencies that will lead to a future critical need of labour force (Fassman & 
Sievers 2013).  
     The MS have been implementing measures, such as offering attractive 
conditions to foreign workforce to immigrate to their country or decreasing the 
taxes paid by enterprises so that new corporations can establish their 
headquarters within their country, to counter these tendencies and prevent these 
trends from continuing to happen. Another common effort made by the 
governments are giving incentives to the general population to grow a family, 
delaying the retirement age and increasing the taxes paid by the workforce. 
However, they are most likely unsustainable in the long run. 
     According to population projections from the European Commission 
(Eurostat, 2016), between 2016 and 2079, the EU will have a negative cumulative 
natural change1 of roughly 56 870 million. At the same time, the total population 
change2 is expected to be positive because of the cumulative net migration3 of 
65 521 million. Inother words, without migration the demographic development 
of the MS would result in age pyramids narrow at the bottom and sizeable at the 
top. 
In 2015, the world witnessed the greatest refugee (consult Annex 1 for a deeper 
understanding of the concepts) surge since the World War II (UNCHR, 2015). 
The conflicts in the Middle East and in the North Africa led to the flee of huge 
                                                 
1 Difference between the number of live births and the number of deaths over a period of time. 
2 Difference in the size of a population between the end and the beginning of a given period of time. 
3 Difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants over a period of time. 
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masses of population into Europe hoping to find proper life conditions. This 
unexpected event resulted in a meaningful amount of expenditures both in 
administrative and frontier-protection costs. The resources were not available 
immediately and the entry-countries were not financially capable of handling 
effectively with the arrival of nearly 1.3 million asylum seekers. 
     A great part of these asylum seekers is now living in refugee camps settled 
in many countries across Europe. These camps are often compared to prisons 
where the asylum seekers are offered a daily portion of food and water and are 
not given the possibility to work while they are asked to patiently wait for the 
delayed decision to where and when are they going to be reintegrated in (Sarah, 
2013). 
     The EU followed a set of directives and rules that dictates which MS is 
responsible for processing asylum seekers, called the Dublin III regulation. Its 
rules were suspended in 2015 because of the increasing strains brought by the 
climax of the refugee crisis: possibly due to the bureaucratic overload but also 
due to the public pressure put on the governments on a national level (Griese, 
2017).  
     Surveys show that a clear majority of Europeans believe that the influx of 
refugees will increase the likelihood of domestic terrorism and that growing 
diversity on their home countries does not make it a better place to live in (Pew 
Research Center, 2016). These believes shared by a substantial part of the people 
often allied with xenophobic attitudes and unreasonable ideas towards the 
immigrants, ultimately result as a threat to an efficientintegration of the 
immigrants in their new host countries.   
The aim of this thesis is to answer the following questions: “Which are the 
expected repercussions the EU will be subjected to when welcoming refugees?” 
and “Is the integration of the immigrants being properly carried out?”. 
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This thesis offers the interested parties an insight of the modern migrant crisis 
and its consequences. This paper also accesses the economic implications the EU 
is and will be facing when welcoming the asylum seekers, from the moment that 
aid is offered to the integration of the former in the internal job markets. 
Immigration positively impacts the output a country produces. When it comes to 
the effect of immigration on the labour market from the host countries, 
immigrants do not seem to depress the wages and job opportunities of native 
workers.  On the contrary, immigration pressures the natives to seek higher 
education and/or specialized jobs which ultimately results in higher paying jobs 
for the native population. Whenever possible, we assess the impact of the 
refugees in the labour market of the host country, however, the lack of data on 
this subject doesn’t allow us to study its effect extensively like, for instance, the 
immigration does. Summing it up, all arguments presented point to the same 
idea - the migration of working population to the EU is a pillar for its future 
economic growth. 
In respect of the method used in this thesis, it is qualitative, through a vast 
research on working papers, books, studies released by international 
organizations and a final interview to Dr. António Jorge Portas, a Counsellor of 
the Permanent Portuguese Representation to the European Union, where we 
address the migrant crisis in the EU from the perspective of a collaborator that 
works directly with the Concil of the European Union offering a productive 
different insight on this matter (see Annex 5). However, we present a solid 
statistical analysis through the treatment of several databases made available by 
the European Commission.  
In Chapter 2, we present a statistical analysis on the characteristics of the 
population in the EU and its MS. In Chapter 3, we review the literature on the 
economic impact of the immigrants and we present two different studies on the 
impact of two distinct past refugee migrations. The integration of the migrants is 
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also a highlighted topic on this thesis (see Chapter 4) and where the EU seem to 
struggle on. Finally, we appoint the most relevant challenges the EU faces 
nowadays when welcoming these flows of refugees (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 2 - The European Union 
2.1. Overview of the demographic trends 
According to the UN’s latest estimate, the world’s population has grown from 2.5 
billion in 1950 to more than 7.3 billion in 2015, leading to a substantial increase of 
approximately 191%. The EUhas followed this trend but at a slower pace. From 1950 
to 2015, the EU4 went from 379,04 million inhabitants5 into 507,492 million people, 
representing a growth of nearly 34%. In other words, the population of the EU 
represented roughly 15% of the world’s population in 1950, stands for approximately 
7% nowadays.   
The natural change6 in the EU does not seem to follow the same path as the growth 
of its population. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the natural change ratio in the EU. 
Over the years, we can notice a declining tendency of the natural change rate value 
and most importantly, we can witness the first negative value in over 50 years 
occurring in 2015.  
We can also observe this phenomenon from a different view on Figure 2, i.e. observing 
both the live birth rate and the mortality rate of the EU-28. The live birth rate suffered 
a sharp decline ranging from 18,54 in 1961 into 10,09 in 2016. The mortality rate, 
however, remained almost constant, with a rate of 10,10 in 1961 compared to 10,05 in 
2016. In 2015, the mortality rate (orange line) surpasses the live birth rate (blue line), 
supporting the negative natural change rate showed previously in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The data regarding the EU includes the UK because it is still part of the EU at the time of this work.  
5 Excluding the inhabitants from the following micro-states: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican 
City. 
6 The difference between live births and deaths per thousand people per year. 
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Figure 1 - Evolution of the natural change as a % of the total population in the EU-28 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data retrieved from the following Eurostat dataset: 
“Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [demo_gind]”  
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Figure 2 - Evolution of the live birth and death ratios in the EU-28 (per 1000 inhabitants) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data retrieved from the following Eurostat dataset: 
“Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [demo_gind]”  
 
Moreover, the life expectancy at birth increased significantly. As an example, Malta 
presented an increase of 11,5 years in its life expectancy at birth from 1980 to 2015. 
Actually, as time went by, all MS without exception saw an increase in their life 
expectancy at birth (Annex 2)7.  
These demographic trends lead to an unavoidable increase of the elderly 
population in the EU. From 1991 to 2016, the proportion of population over 65 years 
of age increased significantly in the EU and, specifically, in five greatest8 economies in 
the EU (Figure 3). In the EU, it was observed an increase of 25% from 2001 to 2016. 
These changes in the age distribution of the population will have multiple economic 
and social effects on the MS. 
                                                 
7 This was not exclusive of the EU, as according to the World Bank (2016) the world’s average life expectancy increased 
from 52.586 years in 1960 to 71.889 years in 2015. 
8 According to the GDP output (OECD 2016). 
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Figure 3 - Population with 65 or over years of age in proportion to the population between 15 and 65 
years  
 
Source: Author’s computation using Eurostat dataset “Population: Structure indicators 
[demo_pjanind]”  
*Missing values in the database didn’t allow us to show the evolution of the EU elderly population in 
the total population prior to 2001 and in France for the year of 1960) 
 
Additionally, there is a decrease in the young dependency ratio (Figure 4) 9, i.e. the 
amount of population aged between 0 and 14 years of age in the total working age 
population (15-64 years of age). The favourable aspect is that in the short-run, the 
working-population is having less economical pressure to sustain this group age. The 
unfavourable part is that in the long-run, this age group will eventually become the 
working age population and this last age group will be thinner than the previous one.   
                                                 
9 For this discussion, we will use France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain as benchmarks for the EU due 
to: 1) their substantial economic output when compared to other member states; 2) given that they represented 63% of 
the EU population in 2017; 3) data availability. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
European
Union (current
composition)
Germany (until
1990 former
territory of the
FRG)
Spain France Italy United
Kingdom
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
Countries/Years
1960 1991 2001 2016
21 
 
Figure 4 – Young dependency ratio 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation using Eurostat dataset “Population: Structure indicators 
[demo_pjanind]”.  
Notes: Unavailability of data for France prior to 1991. The “Mean” value is the mean of Germany, 
Italy, United Kingdom and Spain values from 1960 to 1990, and from 1995 to 2015 the value of France 
was utilized as well.  
 
There has also been an increase in the population dependency ratio – the non-
working population vis-à-vis the working-population (Figure 5). For example, in the 
last 20 years Germany’s population dependency ratio increased 12%, in France it 
increased more than 10% and in Italy 21%. When this ratio increases, the burden on 
the workforce increases because of the higher economical dependency of young and 
elderly people.  This results in a widespread of consequences in the labour market, as 
the working-aged population is the one that provides it; in savings, since savings are 
higher in the working-aged population and ultimately, in the public finances (Bloom 
et al., 2010). The European Commission (2010) already acknowledged the important 
economic challenge the MS face with the constant growth of their aging populations. 
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Figure 5 - Population dependency ratio 
 
Source: Author’s computation using Eurostat dataset “Population: Structure indicators 
[demo_pjanind]”.  
Notes: Unavailability of data for France prior to 1991. The “Mean” value was computed by a 
calculation of a mean of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Spain values from 1960 to 1990, and 
from 1995 to 2015 the value of France was added to the calculation. Data regarding the EU (current 
position) starts from 2005 due to inexistence of prior data covering all member states. 
 
Japan was the first nation experiencing a large shrinking of its working age 
population and an enlargement of its elder population. It offers a valuable case-study 
apprenticeship for the EU MS. Briefly, Japan suffered a significant decline in its 
working age population, and consequently a declining in its labour force. The 
constraint on the labour supply lead to an inferior marginal product of capital, which 
in turn, resulted in a gradually decrease on Japan’s economic growth (Shirakawa, 
2012).  
Persson (2002) reached a similar result but for a different nation, the United States 
of America. The author evaluated the impact on output of a higher dependency ratio 
and concluded that there was a negative impact on the per capita GDP growth. 
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Moreover, a recent study found that an increase in the ratio of workers with +55 
years of age in the total working-population results in an economical and statistical 
decrease in the growth rate of labour productivity (Aiyar, Ebeke, & Shao, 2016)10. The 
same study presented the demographic impact on the annual TFP from 1984 to 2007 
in the European economies (Figure 6), and a projection of an even more severe impact 
in the future (Figure 7). 
Regarding the relationship between these demographic tendencies and public 
expenditures, OECD (2017) concludes that the public expenditures on pensions 
increased from an average of 6.7% of GDP to 8.2% between 2000 and 2013 in the OECD 
countries. This work also discloses that on average, public pensions account to 18% of 
the total public finances, being the largest single item on social expenditures in most 
of the times. 
Notwithstanding, there is a key factor that differs from these patterns which has 
not been on our scope of analysis: migration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Specifically, Aiyar et al. (2016) estimated that an increase of 1 percentage point in the 55-64 age group of the workforce 
would result in losses of 4 to 5 percentage points on the total factor productivity. 
24 
 
Figure 6 – Demographic impact on annual TFP growth, 1984 – 2007 (percent) 
 
Source: Retrieved from the IMF working paper Aiyar et al. (2016)  
Notes: United Kingdom starts from 1985; Switzerland starts from 1992; Austria and Ireland start from 
1995; Estonia and Slovakia start from 1996; Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia start from 2001. EA 
comprises Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain. 
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Figure 7 - Demographic impact on annual TFP growth, 2014 – 2035 (percent) 
 
Source: Retrieved from the IMF working paper Aiyar et al. (2016) 
 
Through the years, migration into the EU followed an opposite evolution than the 
natural change (Figure 8). From 1960 to 1985, net immigration (the difference between 
people entering and people leaving the EU) fluctuated between positive and negative 
values while the natural change has been constantly positive but decreasing. Since 
1985 until the present, net immigration values were always positive. Moreover, as 
from 1992 it features as a more contributor component to the population growth than 
natural change.  
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Figure 8 - Components of population change in the EU (as a percentage of the total population)
 
Source: Retrieved from Batsaikhan et al. (2018) 
 
It is of extreme importance to realize that the flows of immigrants not always had 
the same reasons behind their movements. Often in the past, an enhanced economic 
status was the main driver for immigration (Peri, 2016). In the recent years however, 
the EU has been the destination of an astounding number of refugees fleeing war and 
conflicts zones especially from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Bommes et 
al. (2014). From 2008 to 2017, the EU received more than 5 million first time asylum 
requests (for additional details on the possible asylum decisions outcomes please 
consult Annex 3),3,675 million of which occurred between 2014 and 2017 (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9 – Number of first-time asylum applicants in the EU (2008-2017) 
 
Source – Data retrieved from Eurostat dataset “Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by 
citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded) [migr_asyappctzm]” 
In other words, records show that in 2014, 2015 and 2016 the inflow of asylum 
seekers were of extreme significance. In 2016, as a title of example, the amount of 
asylum seekers was pratically the same as the inflows due to the net migration (Figure 
10). 
Regarding the immigration of the non-EU citizens, as we can see from  
Figure 11 most of the foreign population entering the EU MS are in the working-
force age group 11 . In 2014, of the 1 565 740 immigrants with foreign citizenship 
1 443 139 were on the working-force age group, a roughly 92% participation. 
Immigration into the EU from foreign citizens presents as a possible solution to MS’ 
aging population problem. The arrival of population ready to join the workforce may 
attenuate the pressure put on the MS welfare systems (United Nations 2000). 
However, EU citizens show a negative perception on the impact of immigration on 
                                                 
11 It is considered that the working-force age group agglomerates the population between 15 and 65 years of age. 
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the public services (Heath et al., 2016). The economic impact of immigrants is going to 
be further developed in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 10 – First-time asylum requests as a percentage of the total net migration (statistically adjusted) 
 
Source: Author’s computations using Eurostat datasets: “Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by 
citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded) [migr_asyappctzm]” and “Population change - 
Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [demo_gind]” 
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Figure 11 – Immigrants’ age groups, 2013-2016  
 
Source: Author’s computation using Eurostat dataset “Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship 
[migr_imm1ctz]” 
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Chapter 3 - The Economic Impact of Immigrants 
There is a wide range of literature on this field covering themes such as the 
economic impact of migration on the fiscal policies, to the labour markets or on the 
total output. Some of the works discussed in this chapter conclude a positive impact 
from migrants on the host countries while others find neutral or negative impacts. The 
impact of unexpected inflows of asylum seekers is also discussed. Even though there 
isn’t a clear conclusion, the literature review allows us to plausibly appoint some 
factors of great relevance that affect the economic outcome of immigration: the type 
of the economies on which they are re-inserted, the characteristics of the migrants and 
the quickness of their integration. 
3.1 Impact on product 
 
Ortega and Peri (2014) in their macroeconomic study, estimated the impact on GDP 
per capita of a diverse-origin working-population on several countries (both developed 
and developing countries) and concluded that the host countries have seen their income 
per capita increase in a substantial value. Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport (2013) also 
found a positive correlation between birthplace diversity in the workforce and both 
GDP and TFP. 
However, Aleksynska and Tritah (2015) made a harsh critic to the Ortega & Peri 
(2014) analysis. Migrants have different life experiences than natives, and consequently 
developed different skills. This affects the productive skills and thus immigrants and 
natives cannot be treated as homogenous. Nevertheless, Aleksynska and Tritah (2015) 
achieved alike results from the previous authors. Despite controlling for the 
endogeneity of migration and differentiating between high and low skilled workers, 
immigration still shows a positive impact in the economy of the hosting country, 
mainly through increases in income and labour productivity.  
32 
 
Borjas (2003) also treats workers as imperfect substitutes. Even though they might 
have the same level of education, they have distinct levels of experience, and thus, 
cannot be treated as perfect substitutes. His work estimates the impact of immigration 
in the wages of the natives and it will be discussed further, in the next section. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) are other authors that 
assume, as well, the imperfect substitutability of immigrants and natives, 
strengthening even more the critic made to Ortega and Peri (2014). The latter authors, 
“find evidence for immigration to be positively and causally related to per capita 
income” (page 179). 
Borjas (2013) studies the impact of the immigrants in the United States of America. 
He believes immigration (legal and illegal) made the overall U.S economy larger, 
estimating an annual 10,7% increase in the GDP of the country. 
Jaumotte, Koloskova, & Saxena, (2016) estimation model is based on Ortega and 
Peri (2014), however, their model is more relevant to our study because their sample is 
restrained to developed economies alone (and so are all the EU MS).  Therefore, a more 
challenging test on the possibility of immigration affecting GDP per capita occurs due 
to the elimination of the frequent gaps in incomes between developed and developing 
countries. These authors found that in the long-run, hosting countries’ GDP per capita 
can grow up to 2 percentage points for each 1 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of migrants in the total adult population. 
The recent decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU – also known as “Brexit”12 
- has been a matter of study in this field as well. Portes & Forte (2016) used previous 
estimation models from Jaumotte et al. (2016) and Boubtane et al. (2014) to estimate the 
long-term economic impact in the UK from a reduction in the immigration from other 
EU MS. Using Boubtane et al. (2014) estimates, their computed scenario showed a 
negative significant impact in the GDP per capita and GDP, 0,1% and 0,3% respectively, 
from a reduction of 100 000 in the UK’s net migration. Using Jaumotte et al. (2016) work, 
                                                 
12 Please consult Sampson (2017) for an overview of the economic implications related to the Brexit. 
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GDP per capita would decrease by 0,4% and GDP by 0,55%. Finally, the authors project 
scenarios for the evolution of GDP and GDP per capita until 2030. In both scenarios 
(central and extreme) GDP and GDP per capita would fall. In the intermediate scenario, 
GDP fall would be between 2,73% and 5,19% and GDP per capita between 0,92% and 
3,38%. In the extreme scenario, GDP decreases between 4,35% and 8,18% and GDP per 
capita between 1,53% and 5,36%. 
From the literature review discussed in this section, it can be understood that the 
numerous authors studying this subject seem to agree that immigration impacts the 
output of the host country positively, specially in the long-run. 
3.2 Impact on wages 
 
Nickell & Saleheen (2015) collected data on different jobs taken by immigrants on a 
regional level in the United Kingdom. In their computations, they used a weighted 
average of native and immigrants’ wages to assess the impact of immigration on the 
value of the former. They find a small but negative impact on the average occupational 
wage rate of the natives across the regions (roughly a 1,5% drop in the native workers’ 
wages in the semi/unskilled sector). 
Portes & Forte, (2016) using Nickell and Saleheen (2015) estimates, evaluate the  impact 
of immigration on wages in the low to medium skill service sector. They conclude that an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the proportion of immigrants translates into a decrease 
of the wages in this sector of almost 0.2%. The decrease in the wages of the natives is near 
to 0.15%. Additionally, the authors appoint the great likelihood that EU migrants will 
rather impact this sector than the total working age population given they are more likely 
to enter on this sector. Based on this, they achieve a positive impact on wages of a decrease 
in migration to the UK, referring an increase in wages of 0.12% by 2020 and 0.51% by 2030. 
Borjas (2003) also finds a negative impact on wages resulting from the immigration in 
the United States of America. He collected data on education and age groups of 
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immigrants and natives across the USA country between 1980 and 2000, and concluded 
that the influx of immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the wage of the native 
workers, on average, by 3.2%. Some educational groups, namely the high school dropouts, 
saw their wages dropped by 8.9%. Additionally, it is concluded that an influx of 
immigrants that increase the workforce in 10% reduces annual earnings by 6.4% and the 
total time worked by 3.7%. 
Card (2005) on the other hand, finds no evidence that confirms Borjas’ (2003) work. He 
found that immigration had a minimal impact on the low-skilled (high school dropouts) 
natives’ wages across the cities of the USA. Manacorda et al. (2006) reach the same 
conclusion but in the UK. Even though their work shows that immigration decreases the 
incomes of the immigrants relative to the natives, they also prove that due to the reduced 
immigrants’ proportion in the total population (4%) the impact in earnings is minimal and 
hence, refer that may be the reason to why so many studies fail to find a significant effect 
on the natives’ labour market outcomes. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) study the impact of immigration on wages from 1990 to 2006 
in the United States of America. They used different levels of elasticity of substitution 
between natives and immigrants according to the groups’ education background and 
experience and they found that, in the long-run, immigration increased the average wage 
of a native worker by 0.6% and a large negative effect on the average wage of previous 
immigrants of about 6%. 
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013) study the impact on the natives’ labour market 
conditions due to an increase in immigration in Greece between 2000 and 200713. Most 
of the immigrants were unskilled, which resulted in an increase in the opportunities 
of the skilled native workers, lowering their unemployment rate. Their wage rates also 
increased. However, the wages of the unskilled native workers decreased on average, 
because immigrants were paid less than natives. Due to the lower wages, the 
employment cost of unskilled labour decreased which encouraged the increase in job 
                                                 
13 The data used was retrieved from the World Bank. 
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posts, increasing the job opportunities of the unskilled natives. Nevertheless, the 
overall effect on the native workers was positive. 
Cattaneo et al. (2015) analyse the effect of immigration on the native population using 
the data collected by the European Community Household Panel from 1994 to 2001 in the 
EU-15. They found that immigration generate opportunities for natives to secure higher-
paying and specialized jobs as most of the immigrants take the manual and routine jobs. 
Additionally, immigration also showed to accelerate the process of career upgrade of the 
natives. When it comes to the self-employment workers, the authors found that a 1 percent 
increase in the foreign-born self-employment workers can translate into a decrease up to 
1.1 percent of the native self-employment, however, the decreases in wages of the native 
self-employed were not statistically significant. 
Foged and Peri (2016) study the impact of a refugees’ surge in Denmark. The influx 
was due to war crisis in Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the data range of 
the analisis covers the period between 1994 and 2008. The refugees were received by 
the denish municipalities and the analisis focused on comparing the ones which 
received refugees with the ones which didn’t. According to the Denmark’s refugee-
dispersal policy (between 1986-1998), the municipalities received refugees without 
being aware of their characteristics, thus there were municipalities which received 
more Bosnian or Somalian or Afghan or Iraqi refugees than others. Furthermore, the 
authors purposely detail the analyse of the data covering native individuals aged 18-
65 without college education, i.e low skilled, because they believed they’re the 
workers who face the greater direct competition with refugee immigrants. In 1994 
occured a large inflow of refugees, mainly due to the Balkan war14, and consequently 
forced the revoke of the refugee-dispersal policy in the following years. However, 
since a great number of refugees were already residing in the municipalities, the 
newcomers would preferably join their communities which made the placement of 
the new refugees pratically follow the same initial pattern. As a last note before 
                                                 
14 Please consult Nation (2003) for a detailed insight of the Balkan war. 
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presenting their results, the data gathered by the Danish authorities allow this work 
to follow every or any wage or occupation of the same native-individual even if this 
same individual moved from one municipality to another15. This was highly useful 
from the period 1994 onward, when a greater impact was felt. As it was said early, the 
skills of the refugees were mainly low, and this resulted in a positive effect on the 
wages and employment of the low skilled natives as they were encouraged to change 
specialization and take more complex occupations specializing in non-manual jobs. 
The high skilled natives on the other hand, had no incentive to change specialization 
as the low skilled refugees constitute a complement in their production tasks. Hence, 
the effect on their wages is significant, positive and larger than the effect on low skilled 
native workers. Additionally, to increasing the wages of both high and low skilled 
natives, the influx of refugees also increased the wage differential between these two 
groups. 
The low skilled native individuals presented a 4% increase in the complexity index 
in the municipalities with greater refugees’ influx. After 15 years, the effect on their 
specialization and occupation of less manual jobs is still significant which suggests a 
permanent shift. Following the individual cohort (rather than the municipality), 
wages of native unskilled workers saw a permanent increase of 2.4% in the more 
exposed municipalities, and likewise, the positive effect on wages is still significant 
after 15 years for all municipalities. Following the municipality data, the average 
(positive) wage effect was closer to 1.4%.  
In addition, the authors still approached the effect of the refugees’ influx excluding 
those considered as permanently disabled16 on the unemployed of low skilled natives. 
They assessed that native low skilled workers were, on average, employed 10% more 
hours in the municipalities highly exposed to immigration than those in 
municipalities with lower exposition. This result is allined with the previous results 
                                                 
15 To the best of our knowledge, this is the only work in this literature who treated data capable of tracking the same 
individual through time and space. 
16 Bratsberg et al. (2010) found that 74 percent of the immigrants that were unemployed received a permanent disability 
pension.  
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as most of these natives that were out of job were young and thus they gradually 
found employment in highly cognitive jobs which are complementary with the 
manual jobs of most (low skilled) refugee immigrants. 
3.3 The Mariel Boatlift: an example 
 
In 1980, the USA received a very large flow of Cuban immigrants – this 
phenomenon is most often referred to as the “Mariel Boatlift”17. The state of Florida 
was the main destination of the migrants and between May and September 1980 the 
city of Miami received approximately 125 000 Cubans. It is estimated that about half 
of these immigrants settled permanently in Miami, rising its workforce by 7%. Card 
(1990) studies the impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami’s labour market.  
Card (1990) retrieved data from four other cities in the U.S.A with similar economic 
growth and demographic conditions in the late 70s and the early 80s. He separated 
the population in different ethnic groups so that he could analyse the impact of the 
sudden flow of immigrants with thorough detail. 
Miami and the comparison cities showed a similar employment growth rate 
between 1976 and 1984. The unemployment in Miami increased from 5% in April 1980 
to 7.1% in July however, nationwide unemployment rates followed a similar trend 
suggesting this was not exclusive due to the immigration of the Mariels. There was no 
negative effect on the wage rates of the non-Cuban ethnic groups through 1979 and 
1985. In fact, the city of Miami even showed a better evolution than the comparison 
cities.  
Moreover, the author did not find evidence that the Mariel influx had an impact on 
the unemployment rate of other ethnic groups. Regarding the Cuban ethnic group 
however, there was a meaningful increase in their unemployment rate in Miami. Card 
(1990) indicated that the Cubans’ unemployment rates were nearly 3 percent higher 
                                                 
17 Please consult Engstrom (1997, Chapter 3) for an insight of the political reasons that led to the Mariel Boatlift. 
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between 1980-1981 than what it would have been expected based in previous and later 
patterns.  However, he found no evidence the earlier Cuban immigrants were affected 
substantially by the arrival of the Mariels. 
According to the March 1985 Current Population Survey, 56,5% of the Mariels had 
no high school education. This means that the increase in the labour supply of less-
skilled occupations was much greater. Still, the study showed there was no effect on 
the wage rates of the less-skilled non-Cuban groups as well as no notable evidence of 
an increase in their unemployment rates.  
The author compared the net immigration rate of natives and earlier immigrants 
between Miami and other cities in Florida and noticed the net immigration had slowed 
substantially. He believes that “to some extent the Mariels may have displaced other 
immigrants from within the United States who could have been expected to move to 
Miami.” (page 257). 
The city of Miami witnessed a phenomenal and exemplar integration of the Mariel 
immigrants. The fast absorption of the immigrants into the labour force can be 
explained due to several “welcoming” characteristics that the city of Miami had that 
the other comparison cities did not have. 
First, the characteristics of the Miami labour market were a perfect suit for an influx 
of low-skilled labour. The labour market had been adapting to unskilled manpower 
in the years before the Mariel immigration due to previous influxes of unskilled labour 
which allow the Mariels to enter the labour market with relative ease.  
Second, and accordingly to the 1980 Census, Miami was the most immigrant-
intensive city of the country with 35,5% of its residents being foreign-born. 
Additionally, a sizable portion of the Miami’s population were Hispanic which made 
the lack of knowledge of the English language among the Mariels to have smaller 
effects than what it could have been expected. 
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Finnaly, Miami had been receiving flows of Cuban emigrants in the two decades 
before the Mariel Boatlift. Family reunification and positive past integration 
experiences from Cuban people may helped the integration of the Mariel immigrants. 
Bodvarsson et al. (2008) also perform an analysis of the Mariel Boatlift. They find a 
positive and significant effect on wages of native white wages unlike Card (1990). 
Moreover, Borjas (2017) also reached different results from Card (1990). He assessed 
the evolution of the wages in the low-skilled workforce between 1977-1979 and 1981-
1986, and proved the average wage of the low-skilled workers dropped significantly, 
between 10 and 30%. Moreover, the author defends that the Mariel immigrants had, 
after all, a “sizable negative effect on the wage of competing workers” (page 1108). 
Lastly, Borjas (2017) is critical of Card (1990) because Borjas believes spatial 
correlations in specific places suffer from endogeneity problems – for instance, 
immigrants could have settled in in high-wage regions and thus, studying the impact 
on wages in a high-wage region is very different than in a low-wage region.  
On the other hand, Peri and Yasenov (2015) critic the usage of only two years data 
(1977-1979) by Borjas (2017) to measure the effect on wages brought by the Mariel 
Boatlift. They attempt to improve Card’s (1990) work by applying the Synthetic 
Control Method18. They found no significant negative impact, on the contrary, they 
found a small, yet positive impact on wages. 
It is far-fetched to compare this sudden flow of Cubans into Miami to the refugee 
flows the EU have been receiving. Miami received around 125 thousand people in 5 
months while the EU received more than 4 million in the last 5 years (2013-2017). 
Furthermore, it is to note that this case-study from the city of Miami showed a very 
different approach regarding the receptiveness of the migrants. Miami showed to be 
very openly to integrate the newly-come immigrants in its labour market while, the 
                                                 
18 Please consult Abadie et al. (2015) for a better insight about this method and its application.  
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EU, have seen some MS to do the exact opposite, as António Jorge Portas mentioned 
see question 3 in Annex 5 “(…) em muitos EM as respetivas classes dirigentes 
concluíram que a melhor forma de lidar com o fenómeno migratório e gerir as 
consequências da pressão migratória seria a adoção de medidas mais restritivas, para 
tentar dar resposta aos anseios e receios, fundados ou não, da opinião pública. Podem 
aqui referir-se alguns dos EM do Leste, em particular o grupo de Visegrado composto 
pela PL, HU, SK e CZ, mas também alguns EM do Norte da Europa, em que a DK será 
o exemplo mais evidente.”. However, this experience the city of Miami went through 
may be looked at as an exemplar occurrence of immigrant integration on a micro-level 
that the EU countries aim to reach on a macro-level. We will dive deeper on the 
integration of immigrants and its relevance at an economic perspective in the next 
chapter. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The most basic economic principals explain that an increase in the labour supply 
inherently decreases the real wages in the short run. However, numerous authors 
prove it wrong and show us that the matter is not that simple. The level of expertise 
of the immigrants, the type of economies where they are re-inserted and the amount 
of the influxes of immigrants are some of the relevant factors which may dictate their 
economic impact and alter the suggestion of a decrease in the real wages brought by 
the law of supply for example. In fact, it has been proved that an increase in the labour 
supply due to the arrival of immigrants may increase the host country GDP and move 
the natives to higher-paying jobs without deteriorating the overall wages’ conditions. 
There are no certain conclusions and it is impossible to suggest the immigrants can 
worsen or improve the host countries’ economies without doubt because every host 
country and immigrant influx have their unique characteristics. 
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Notwithstanding, with this chapter one can indicate key factors brought by 
immigration, such as the number of immigrants arriving, their education degree and 
work experience, that certaintly influence (either positively or negatively) the 
economic features of a host country.  
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Chapter 4 - Integration of migrants 
Integration is a multi-faceted process that includes themes from an economic 
perspective such as the labour market integration to themes more linked to the social 
integration such as the access to the national health care systems and the participation 
in the different social institutions such as associations and organizations or events. We 
will especially focus our analysis in an economic overview. Naturally, asylum seekers 
face greater challenges to their integration than other migrants. For one, a great part 
of the asylum seekers are still living in low-cost houses and refugee camps waiting for 
the outcome of their application. Additionally, refugees face aggravated legal barriers 
to employment (Hatton, 2013) while the other migrants migrate to specific locations 
with a job already secured in most of the cases.  
The labour market integration of refugees is crucial to relieve the public finances as 
they move from receiving assistance to paying contributions, resulting as well in GDP 
per capita gains. Notwithstanding, it has been proven that resettled refugees have a 
slower labour market integration when compared to other migrants even when 
controlling for educational attainment, host country language skill and age (Ott, 2013). 
The knowledge of the host country’s language is a key driver to integration as it is 
positively correlated with the employment rate19. Dumont et al. (2016) found that if 
refugees had the same level of language as natives do, the labour market 
participation20 of the former would be 10 percent higher. 
In this chapter, we will approach the “refugee gap” 21  in the labour market, 
addressing both the employment and the unemployment rates, barriers to integration, 
the impact of education in the labour market outcomes, the financial inclusion of the 
refugees and the improvement of their integration through time. 
                                                 
19 Calculated through dividing the employed population by the total working age population (aged 15-64) 
20 Calculated through dividing the labour force by the total working-age population) 
21 Differences between the refugees and both other migrants and native population. 
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4.1 Integration in the labour market 
The labour market participation of refugees is a key indicator of the degree of 
integration of the migrants. In Annex 4we can observe the numerous studies and their 
findings of the labour market performance of refugees compared to other migrants 
and the natives. Very briefly, the resettled refugees show higher unemployment 
rates 22 , lower labour market participation, significant lower earnings and higher 
welfare usage than both other migrants and the native population. The data presented 
in the following paragraphs will be, whenever possible, divided between three 
different groups: native-born, first-generation migrants 23  and second-generation 
migrants24. 
On average, in the year of 2017 in the EU, the unemployment rate among the natives 
was 7,2 percent while the foreign-born presented nearly the double reaching an 
unemployment rate of 13,6 percent. However, over time, there is a significant positive 
economic development given that the unemployment rates decreased (Figure 12).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Calculated through dividing the number of unemployed people by the labour force. 
23 Refers to the foreign-born citizens that immigrated to the EU. 
24 Refers to the citizens born in the EU, children of the first-generation migrants. 
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Figure 12 - Unemployment rate by place of birth and migration status of people between aged 15-64  
 
Source: Author’s computations using Eurostat dataset: “Unemployment rates by sex, age and country of birth (%) 
[lfsa_urgacob]”. 
The EU citizens living in a MS other than their birth country had their unemployment 
rate decrease from 13,3% in 2012 to 7,7% in 2017. The native-born unemployment 
dropped as well since they had 9,9% in 2012 and 7,2% in 2017. The non-EU born 
showed the greater change in their unemployment rate, going from 19,6% in 2012 to 
13,6% in 2017.  
In Figure 13, we can have a closer look to the challenge the foreign-born face in the 
EU MS individually when it comes to their integration into the labour market.  
The first-generation migrants refers to the population born outside the EU but 
migrated into the EU and the second-generation migrants are their children which 
already have born in the EU. Controlling for the unemployment rate of the natives in 
their country25, the countries where the first-generation migrants seem to struggle the 
most to join the labour market are Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway and 
                                                 
25 This was computed by dividing the unemployment rate of the 1st generation migrants for the native’s unemployment 
rate in the same country. 
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Switzerland. In the previous listed countries, the unemployment rate among the 
migrants were two times greater than the unemployment rate of the natives despite 
Belgium and Norway, where the migrants experienced unemployment rates three 
times higher than the natives. This means that the migrants face considerable 
challenges to integrate in the job market, especially in these countries. There are some 
countries however, where the migrants registered lower unemployment rates 
comparing to those of the natives, namely, in Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary. When it 
comes to the employment rate (Figure 14), in Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia this group showed 
higher employment rate than the natives. This most likely suggests either that 
migrants came to these countries with a job already secured or they presented better 
educational and/or professional backgrounds than natives. Notwithstanding, in 
Belgium, Germany, France, Austria and Sweden, this group presented an 
employment rate at least 8% lower than the natives. 
Regarding the second-generation migrants, they presented employment rates 
higher than the natives in Bulgaria and Lithuania. They also presented a level of 
employment close 26  to the natives in Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom and Norway, suggesting successful integration 
processes. However, in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, 
Portugal and Finland, natives showed employment rates at least 14 percent higher 
which is a very concerning finding. Looking at these employment rates, specially at 
the disparities between the natives and the second-generation migrants in the latter 
countries, we can conclude that there’s still a long way to an effective integration of 
the migrants to take place. 
The unemployment rate of this group though, show slightly brighter outcomes than 
their predecessors relative to the native’s employment rate, easing their integration to 
                                                 
26 A difference equal or smaller than 5 percentage points.  
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the labour market. In fact, in Poland, second-generation migrants presented an 
unemployment rate 2.1% lower than the natives. 
Overall, the non-EU born have on average greater challenges in the labour market 
presenting weaker labour market outcomes than natives (European Commission, 
2016). From our analysis, even though the second-generation of migrants seem to 
register better labour outcomes overall when compared to the first-generation of 
migrants, in some countries the differences in employment between the migrants and 
the natives still reach very significant values. As a title of example, in Cyprus the 
difference in the employment rate of the natives when compared to the second-
generation migrants is of 23,9%, while, when it comes to their predecessors, the 
biggest difference registered between them and the natives is in Sweden, and its value 
is 13%.  
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Figure 13 – Unemployment rate by migration status, in 2014, of 15-64 aged population, in the EU-25, 
Norway and Switzerland 
  
Source: Edited using Eurostat dataset: “Unemployment rate by sex, age, migration status, citizenship and 
educational attainment level [lfso_14luner]”. Note: due to missing values, the following countries were deleted from the 
sample: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. 
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Figure 14 – Employment rate by migration status, in 2004, of 15-64 aged population, in the EU-25,   
Norway and Switzerland 
 
Source: Edited using Eurostat dataset: “Employment rate by sex, age, migration status, citizenship and educational 
attainment level [lfso_14lempr]”. Note: Romania was excluded due to missing values.  
4.2 The case of the refugees 
 
The refugees are a particular case because they make up a specific inner group from 
the foreign-born immigrants. According to the EU Labour Force Survey27, in 2014, 52% 
of the working-age non-EU born migrated into the EU due to family reasons, 25% for 
work reasons, 7% for educational reasons and 7% (1.8 million 28 ) were refugees 
constituting the smallest non-EU born migrant group. In 2014, 80% of the refugees 
were residing in four EU MS (Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden and France) 
(Figure 15).  
 
                                                 
27 Please consult http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey for additional details. 
28 Denmark, Ireland and The Netherlands did not present data on this matter, meaning that, in reality, there are more 
than 1.8million refugees in the EU. 
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Figure 15 –Refugees by main host countries in selected European countries, 15-64, 2014, thousands  
 
Source: Retrieved from Dumont et al. (2016). 
 
In Figure 16 we can notice that, in 2014, on average, 56% of refugees are employed 
while among the natives the employment rate is 65%. The refugees’ unemployment 
rate is 19% representing the highest value among the non-EU born groups (and among 
the natives).  
The employment rate of the refugees varies across the MS. In Spain and Finland, 
refugees’ employment rate is 40,6% and 43,4% respectively, while in Slovenia, Italy 
and Austria it is 74,1%, 61,3% and 60,2% respectively. Comparing their employment 
rates with the other foreign-borns (Figure 17), they are still very behind. It was only in 
two countries (Italy and Slovenia) that they did surpass the employment levels of the 
other foreign-born, one’s data of which considered as low reliable. In the other 10 
countries of our sample they presented lower employment rates than the first 
generation of migrants, especially in Spain, where their rate was 30.1% below. 
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Figure 16 – Employment and unemployment rate of refugees, other non-EU born and natives in the 
EU, aged 15-64, 2014 
 
Source: Retrieved from Dumont et al. (2016). 
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Figure 17 – Employment rate of refugees and foreign-born, aged 15-64, 2014 
 
Source: Author’s computations using Eurostat datasets: “Employment rate by sex, age, migration status, citizenship 
and educational attainment level [lfso_14lempr]” & “Employment rate of first generation of immigrants by sex, age, 
years of residence and reason for migration [lfso_14l1empr]”. Note: *Low reliability data for Croatia and Slovenia. The 
remaining EU member states were omitted due to the lack of data. 
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Chapter 5 - The challenges  
The most immediate challenges the EU faced and is currently facing when hosting 
a large group of individuals who seek refuge are the government expenditures and 
the increase in the aggregate demand. The hosting countries committed additional 
public spending for the first reception cares and services such as the provision of 
housing, food and water, health and education to the asylum seekers.  As the 
procurement for these products and services increases, as well as an overall increase 
in the aggregate demand, it is to expect an increase in the overall prices. At the same 
time, while the refugees gradually join the labour market, the host countries may 
witness possible downward pressures on wages. By other words, the diminishing 
purchase power and the increasing level of prices translates into a challenge the EU 
MS are already addressing: inflation. This effect is specifically aggravated in countries 
like Italy, Greece and Hungary where the asylum seekers arrive and simply await to 
receive the refugee status to move to more attracting countries like Germany and 
Sweden where they expect to find lesser barriers to employment. In this last scenario, 
those three MS apply resources with a reduced chance of producing returns since the 
recently arrived workforce leaves short after. 
The fiscal costs supported by the governments and their fiscal policies are also a 
relevant challenge. The hosting countries’ policies need to be adapted to include the 
additional government spending associated with the welcoming of the individuals 
who seek asylum. The applicants in the asylum process are assisted for a period up to 
2 years and the rejected applicants up to 1 year and both these types of individuals are 
still not eligible to work. Additionally, the accepted applicants who are unemployed 
benefit from monetary aids from the social welfare systems. The costs in border-
control and security issues are also significant, especially in the first-entry countries 
such as Spain, Italy and Greece. The integration programs are also highly costly. These 
are examples of fiscal costs supported by the governments and the challenge the 
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hosting countries face is to shape their fiscal policies in order to include the costs of 
receiving refugees while at the same time not deteriorating the lifestyle of the 
population and stimulating the economy. 
Another challenge is the swiftness of the integration of the newcomers into the 
labour market. As we addressed before in Chapter 4,the skills and work experience of 
the refugees, their ability to learn the native language, among other factors, are all 
characteristics that influence their integration into the economy that are out of the 
scope of the governments. However, the hosting countries may assist and contribute 
for a swifter integration, for example by implementing integration plans and courses 
which would be mandatory to attend by the refugees and creating incentives that 
encourage the enterprises to hire refugees. In fact, in Austria, Germany and Sweden, 
the three countries who received the greatest number of refugees, it has been made 
mandatory for a third-country national to attend integration programs29. The final goal 
of these programs is to help the newcomers to be reinserted into society, adopting the 
cultural values of the hosting countries. For example, the German integration course, 
combines 600 hours of German language courses and 100 hours of civic orientation. 
In Sweden, as of the 1st of January of 2018 refugees are mandatory to attend a 2 years 
Introduction program in which they receive educational duty lessons and are taught 
about the insights needed to be inserted in the Swedish society and labour market. 
The Swedish government created also a “fast-track” program for the newcomers 
whose skills and experience background meet the Swedish labour market needs such 
as doctors, school teachers and pharmacists. Even though these integration programs 
can be costly, they should be sustainable as they expectily bear positive outcomes for 
the economy in the medium to the long term. The social aid the refugees receive for 2 
years are deducted in the long run as they join the labour market and start to 
                                                 
29 On 7 June 2016, the European Commission presented the Action Plan on Integration which, among other propositions, 
suggest third-country nationals’ access to social assistance should be conditional on their participation on the integration 
programs created by the EU member states. 
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contribute to the social welfares in the form of taxes to their income, this is, evidently, 
if a proper integration effort is carried out. 
The impact in the medium to long term period crucially depends on the refugees’ 
integration into the labour market. The extent to which the skills of the foreign 
nationals complement or substitute those of the natives is also a relevant factor. 
Recently, the unemployment rates among natives and foreign-born population are 
still very different. For example, as of March 2017, 4.1% of the natives in Sweden were 
unemployed compared to 22.2% among the foreign-born population (European 
Parliament, 2018). Regarding the refugees, from the query to 25 OECD countries, the 
gap in the unemployment rate between natives and refugees were of 9% (Dumont et 
al., 2016). Given these disparities in unemployment and the growing share of third-
country nationals among the EU population, it is expected a decrease in the GDP per 
capita (especially in the MS who welcome a high number of refugees). On the other 
hand, as the workforce grows, it is to expect an increase in the GDP of the hosting 
countries. Nonetheless, the MS face the challenge of narrowing the unemployment 
gap between natives and foreign-born over time without rising government debt 
(especially on those countries with fragile fiscal positions) nor affecting the living-style 
of the population. The role of policies is of a great deal as well.   
Another expected barrier in the long-term is related to the public opinion towards 
the refugees. The growing anti-immigrant attitudes and the growing influence of 
national political parties that advocate a more restrictive approach towards the 
immigrant policies across the EU – as stated by António Jorge Portas in question 4 in 
Annex 5 “vários EM se começou a verificar um acentuar de viragem em direcção a 
políticas claramente restritivas da imigração, extremistas e populistas, como é o caso, 
apenas a título de mero exemplo, na PL, HU, AT, IT, e o crescimento dos partidos 
políticos da extrema-direita radical em alguns outros, como é o caso mais 
paradigmático da Alemanha” – are very likely to negatively impact the social cohesion 
and the political environment across  the MS. Ultimately, reaching an agreement that 
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satisfies all the MS on the reform of the Common European Asylum System will be an 
harder task, as António Jorge Portas asserted in question 6 in Annex 5: “Na  reforma 
do sistema de asilo e a criação de um sistema reforçado de gestão de migração legal  
não será fácil acolher políticas nacionais hoje tão diferentes”, which will eventually 
translate into difficulties for the successful integration of the refugees. 
When it comes to the problems brought by the aging of the population and namely, 
by the workforce (Chapter 2), Aiyar et al. (2016) identified the policies which would 
help minimize the negative marginal effect of the previous on the TFP. Providing ease 
and greater access to health care services and active labour market policies focused on 
the training and the development of the workforce’s skills, are the (statistically 
significant) policies in which a greater attention should take place. The government 
contribution to investments on R&D is also a policy that contributes to minimizing the 
effect of aging on TFP. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
We showed how the population age in the EU is changing and becoming older, 
entailing both losses in the total product outcome (GDP) and increases in the public 
finances expenses due to the increasing amount of resources applied to pensions. 
Additionally, we highlighted migration as a phenomenon that somewhat counters the 
previous effects as it brings more people within the workforce age range (15-64 years 
of age) to the EU.  
Even though the economic impact of the immigrants remains a controversial topic, 
it is a known fact that immigration positively impacts the output a country produces. 
When it comes to the effect of immigration on the host countries’ labour markets, the 
overall effect is positive. Immigrants do not always depress the wages of the native 
workers but when they do, they incentive employers to create more work posts the 
which results in more job opportunities for the native workers.  Immigration also 
pressures the natives to seek higher education and/or specialized jobs which 
ultimately results in higher paying jobs for the native workforce. 
The integration of the migrants is possibly the ultimate current challenge the EU is 
trying to overcome. As the data we presented showed, both the first-generation and 
second-generation immigrants presented both lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates than the natives in most MS of the EU. Even though the foreign-
born immigrants saw their unemployment rate dropping by 6 percentage points from 
2012 to 2017, in 2017, the foreign-born presented, on average, an unemployment rate 
almost two times higher than the natives. This suggests that the EU still has a long 
way to go according to its impartiality and equality principals. 
Finally, we appointed the greatest challenges the EU faced and is facing when 
welcoming refugees. The most challenging task, at least in the short-run, was the 
administrative and border-control related costs to safely receive more than 5 million 
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unexpected asylum seekers. The EU showed to be capable to manage this influx 
through time and it is now focusing on the following challenges that, in a way or 
another, are related to the proper integration of the welcomed refugees. Since there 
isn’t a common european policy for the integration of the refugees, as António Jorge 
Portas confirmed: “Não existe uma política comum de integração na UE.” (see 
question 5 in Annex 5), its integration across the MS will be an individual challenge of 
each MS that will dictate how the EU will answer to this challenge in specific. The MS 
are free to choose the most suitable policy for their countries and there is already a 
project taking place called the NEIM (National Integration Evaluation Mechanism) 
project that aims to provide the proper tools to effectively deal with the integration of 
refugees. This project will create complex evaluations of the current integration 
policies in several MS, measuring which policies present the best results through the 
study of key indicators. Nevertheless, the EU presents itself as an organization able to 
overcome unexpected challenges, and through the transparency and cooperation 
across all the MS,it is expected they will eventually put in practice the policies which 
present the best results. . 
Some developments can be made to this thesis that would result in interesting 
studies.  
First, it would be interesting to studythe impact on the labour market across the EU 
due to the recent refugee wave, namely, the impact on wages. While there has been 
an extensive research on this field, there are no quantitative studies that measure the 
impact of the inflow of refugees in the labour market nor is there a consensus on the 
impact on the employment and/or on the salaries. Studying the effect on productivity 
and the impact on the natives’ choice on education would be also interesting. These 
studies are dependent on the availability of specific quantitative data which is not, in 
the best of our knowledge and by the time we finished this thesis, available. 
Second, there are many reports (essential media reports) related to the lost of 
qualifications by the refugees when they enter the new labour markets in the host 
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countries. On a more qualitative type of analysis (for instance, as a survey directed for 
the refugees accross the different MS), it would be of great interest to study this matter. 
Ultimately, the question to be answered would be: “Are refugees to some extent 
working on jobs below their qualifications?”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Bibliografia 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2015). Comparative Politics and the 
Synthetic Control Method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 495–510. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12116 
Agency, U. N. R. 1951. (1951). The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (Vol. 10). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/10.2.255 
Aiyar, S., Ebeke, C., & Shao, X. (2016). The Impact of Workforce Aging on European 
Productivity. 
Aleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2015). THE HETEROGENEITY OF IMMIGRANTS , 
HOST COUNTRIES ’ INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY : A CHANNEL 
ACCOUNTING APPROACH, 53(1), 150–172. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12141 
Alesina, A., Harnoss, J., & Rapoport, H. (2013). Birthplace diversity and Economic 
Prosperity. 
Batsaikhan, U., Darvas, Z., & Raposo, I. (2018). PEOPLE ON THE MOVE : 
MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., & Fink, G. (2010). Implications of population ageing for 
economic growth. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 26(4), 583–612. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grq038 
Bodvarsson, Ö. B., Van den Berg, H. F., & Lewer, J. J. (2008). Measuring immigration’s 
effects on labor demand: A reexamination of the Mariel Boatlift. Labour Economics, 
15(4), 560–574. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2008.04.003 
Bommes, M., Fassman, H., & Sievers, W. (2014). Migration from the Middle East and 
North Africa to Europe: Past Developments, Current Status and Future 
Potentials. Amsterdam University Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=496763;keyword=Emigration 
Borjas, G. J. (2003). The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the 
62 
 
impact of immigration on the labor market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118(4), 1335–1374. 
Borjas, G. J. (2013). Immigration and the American Worker: A Review of the Academic 
Literature. Center for Immigration Studies, (April), 1–26. Retrieved from 
http://cis.org/immigration-and-the-american-worker-review-academic-literature 
Borjas, G. J. (2017). The Wage Impact of the Marielitos. ILR Review, 70(October), 
1979391769294. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793917692945 
Boubtane, E., Dumont, J., & Rault, C. (2014). Immigration and Economic Growth in 
the Immigration and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries , 1986-2006, 
(8681), 1986–2006. 
Bratsberg, B., Raaum, O. and Røed, K. (2010). When minority labor migrants meet the 
welfare state. Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28(3), pp. 633–76. 
 
Card, D. (1990). The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XLIII(2), 245–257. 
Card, D. (2005). IS THE NEW IMMIGRATION REALLY SO BAD ?*. The Economic 
Journal, 115(1), 300–323. 
Cattaneo, C., Fiorio, C. V., & Peri, G. (2015). What Happens to the Careers of European 
Workers When Immigrants “Take Their Jobs”? Journal of Human Resources, 50(3), 
655–693. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.3.655 .  
Chassamboulli, A., & Palivos, T. (2013). The Impact of Immigration on Unemployment and 
Wages. Retrieved from www.bankofgreece.gr .  
Dumont, J., Liebig, T., Peschner, J., Tanay, F., & Xenogiani, T. (2016). How are refugees 
faring on the labour market in Europe ? 
Engstrom, D. W. (1997). Presidential Decision Making Adrift – The Carter Administration 
and The Mariel Boatlift. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
European Commission. (2010). Interim EPC-SPS joint report on pensions. URL: 
Http://europa.eu/epc/pdf/interim_epc-Spc_joint_report_on_pensions_final_en.pdf., 1–
63 
 
66. 
European Commission. (2016). Mobility and migration in the EU : Opportunities, 164–
208. 
European Parliament. (2018). Integration for Refugees in Austria, Germany and 
Sweden: Comparative Analysis. Directorate General for Internal Policies, 1–63. 
Felbermayr, G. J., Hiller, S., & Sala, D. (2010). Does immigration boost per capita 
income? Economics Letters, 107(2), 177–179. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.017 
Foged, Mette, and Giovanni Peri. 2016. “Immigrants’ Effect on Native Workers: New 
Analysis on Longitudinal Data. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8(2): 
1–34. 
Heath, A., Schmidt, P., Butt, S., Dorer, B., Fitzgerald, R., Prestage, Y., … Zavala-Rojas, 
D. (2016). Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results 
from Round 7 of the European Social Survey. European Social Survey Topline 
Results, (7), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-93716 
Jaumotte, F., Koloskova, K., & Saxena, S. (2016). Impact of migration on Income Levels in 
Advanced Economies. 
Manacorda, M., Manning, A., & Wadsworth, J. (2006). CEP Discussion Paper No 754 
October 2006 The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Male Wages : Theory 
and Evidence from Britain, (754). 
Nation, R. C. (2003). WAR IN THE BALKANS , 1991-2002. Most. 
Nickell, S., & Saleheen, J. (2008). The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages : 
Evidence from Britain. 
Nickell, S., & Saleheen, J. (2015). “The impact of immigration on occupational wages : 
evidence from Britain”. In: Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No . 574., (574), 
1–44. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2015/sw
p574.pdf 
64 
 
OECD. (2017). Pensions at a Glance 2017: OECD and G20 Indicators. 
Ortega, F., & Peri, G. (2014). Openness and income: The roles of trade and migration. 
Journal of International Economics, 92(2), 231–251. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.11.008 
Ott, E. (2013). The Labour Market Integration of Resettled Refugees. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Services, 
(Evaluation Report 2013/6). Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.asp
x?direct=true&db=bth&AN=30070202 
Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Peri, G. (2012). Rethinking the effect of immigration on wages. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 152–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01052.x 
Peri, G. (2016). Immigrants, Productivity, and Labor Markets. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 30(4), 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.4.3 
Peri, G., & Yasenov, V. (2015). the Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave : NBER 
Working Papers, 21801. https://doi.org/10.3386/w21801 
Portes, J., & Forte, G. (2016). The Economic Impact of Brexit-induced Reductions in 
Migration. 
Sampson, T. (2017). Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 31(4), 163–184. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.4.163 
Shirakawa, M. (2012). Demographic changes and macroeconomic performance – 
Japanese experiences. In BOJ-IMES Conference. 
 
  
65 
 
Websites 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/People_in_the_EU_%E2%80%93_statistics_on_demographic_ch
anges#Main_statistical_findings . Consulted on 10/04/2018 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/economy_en . Consulted on 
15/04/2018 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/. Consulted on 
15/04/2018 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN . Consulted on 18/04/2018 
https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm . Consulted on 
07/05/2018 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ . Consulted on 14/05/2018 
http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2016/09/eu-spending-extra-
border-controls-least-eu17bn . Consulted on 04/06/2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Annexes 
Annex 1 – Concepts 
Concepts Definition 
 
 
 
 
Asylum seeker 
Defined accordingly to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, an asylum seeker is: “a person 
fleeing persecution or serious harm in their own 
country and therefore in need of international 
protection.” Since asylum is a fundamental right, 
every EU member state has the obligation to 
grant asylum to any asylum seeker entering their 
territories. The asylum seekers can then, apply 
for the recognition of the refugee status and 
consequently receive the refugee status as long as 
their fundament for receiving this title is 
considered valid by the host country. 
 
 
Refugee 
 
 
 
The legal status of the term “refugee” was 
first defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention by 
the United Nations Refugee Agency. The 
definition used in this thesis is the one used by 
the EU which is an adoption from the previously 
mentioned convention. The definition is as 
follows: “a person who owning to well founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or owing 
to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”. (United Nations 
Refugee Agency, 1951) 
 
 
Regarding this definition we follow the status 
given by the Dublin regulation: “any person who 
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Third-country national 
 
 
is not a citizen of the Union within the meaning 
of Article 20(1) TFEU and who is not a national 
of a State which participated in this regulation by 
virtue of an agreement with the European 
Union”. (Reg. No 604/2013: article 2). 
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Annex 2 - Life expectancy at birth, 1980-2015 
  1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 2015 
EU 28* - - - 79,9 80,9 80,6 
Belgium** 73,3  76,2  77,9  80,3  81,4  81,1  
Bulgaria 71,1  71,2  71,6  73,8  74,5  74,7  
Czech Republic 70,4  71,5  75,1  77,7  78,9  78,7  
Denmark 74,2  74,9  76,9  79,3  80,7  80,8  
Germany 73,1  75,4  78,3  80,5  81,2  80,7  
Estonia*** 69,5  69,9  71,1  76,0  77,4  78,0  
Ireland**** - 74,8  76,6  80,8  81,4 81,5  
Greece 75,3  77,1  78,6  80,6  81,5  81,1  
Spain 75,5  76,9  79,3  82,4  83,3  83,0  
France***** - - 79,2  81,8  82,9 82,4  
Croatia - - - 76,7  77,9 77,5  
Italy - 77,1  79,9  82,2  83,2 82,7  
Cyprus - - 77,7  81,5  82,8 81,8  
Latvia - - - 73,1  74,5 74,8  
Lithuania 70,5  71,5  72,1  73,3  74,7  74,6  
Luxembourg 72,8  75,7  78,0  80,8  82,3  82,4  
Hungary 69,1  69,4  71,9  74,7  76,0  75,7  
Malta 70,4  - 78,4  81,5  82,1  81,9  
Netherlands - 77,1  78,2  81,0  81,8 81,6  
Austria 72,7  75,8  78,3  80,7  81,6  81,3  
Poland****** - 70,7  73,8  76,4  77,8 77,5  
Portugal******* 71,5  74,1  76,8  80,1  81,3  81,3  
Romania******* 69,2  69,9  71,2  73,7  75,0  75,0  
Slovenia - 73,9  76,2  79,8  81,2 80,9  
Slovakia 70,4  71,1  73,3  75,6  77,0  76,7  
Finland 73,7  75,1  77,8  80,2  81,3  81,6  
Sweden 75,8  77,7  79,8  81,6  82,3  82,2  
United Kingdom - - 78,0  80,6  81,4 81,0  
*2010, 2014 and 2015: break in series.  2014 and 2015: estimate and provisional.   
**2010: break in series-             
***2015: break in series.           
****2014 and 2015: provisional.           
*****2014: break in series. 2015: break in series and provisional.     
******2000 and 2010: break in series.         
*******2014 and 2015: estimate.           
Source: Retrieved from Eurostat dataset: “Life expectancy by age and sex [demo_mlexpec]”. 
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Annex 3 – Asylum decision: types and possible outcomes30 
Type of decision Explanation 
First instance decision 
A decision granted by the respective 
authority acting as a first instance of the 
administrative/judicial asylum procedure in the 
receiving country. 
Final decision on appeal 
A decision granted at the final instance of 
administrative/judicial asylum procedure and 
which results from the appeal lodged by the 
asylum seeker rejected in the preceding stage of 
the procedure. As the asylum procedures and 
the numbers/levels of decision making bodies 
differ between Member States, the true final 
instance may be, according to the national 
legislation and administrative procedures, a 
decision of the highest national court. However, 
the applied methodology defines that 'final 
decisions' should refer to what is effectively a 
'final decision' in the vast majority of all cases: 
i.e. that all normal routes of appeal have been 
exhausted. 
Outcome Explanation 
Rejected applicant 
A person covered by decision rejecting an 
application for international protection, 
including decisions considering applications as 
inadmissible or as unfounded and decisions 
under priority and accelerated procedures, 
taken by administrative or judicial bodies 
during the reference period. 
 
                                                 
30 Source: Eurostat:” http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Asylum_decision” 
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Person being a subject of a pending 
application 
 
A person who is the subject of application 
for international protection under consideration 
by the responsible national authority at the end 
of the reference period. It includes the number 
of persons with pending application at all 
instances of the administrative and/or judicial 
procedure. 
Person granted refugee status 
A person covered by a decision 
granting refugee status, taken by administrative 
or judicial bodies during the reference period. 
Refugee status means status as defined in 
Art.2(d) of Directive 2004/83/EC within the 
meaning of Art.1 of the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 
28 July 1951, as amended by the New York 
Protocol of 31 January 1967. 
Person granted subsidiary protection 
status  
A person covered by a decision granting 
subsidiary protection status, taken by 
administrative or judicial bodies during the 
reference period. Subsidiary protection status 
means status as defined in Art.2(f) of Directive 
2004/83/EC. According to Art.2(e) of Directive 
2004/83/EC a person eligible for subsidiary 
protection means a third country national or a 
stateless person who does not qualify as a 
refugee but in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if returned to his or her 
country of origin, or in the case of a stateless 
person, to his or her country of former habitual 
residence, would face a real risk of suffering 
serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such 
risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country. 
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Person granted authorisation to stay 
for humanitarian reasons  
A person covered by a decision granting 
authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons 
under national law concerning international 
protection, taken by administrative or judicial 
bodies during the reference period. It includes 
persons who are not eligible for international 
protection as currently defined in the first stage 
legal instruments, but are nonetheless protected 
against removal under the obligations that are 
imposed on all Member States by international 
refugee or human rights instruments or on the 
basis of principles flowing from such 
instruments. Examples of such categories 
include persons who are not removable on ill 
health grounds and unaccompanied minors. 
 
. 
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Annex 4 - Multiple studies and their findings on the “refugee 
gap” 
Author & 
Year 
Conclusions Reasons Hypothesized Country Population 
REFUGEES POORER OUTCOMES THAN IMMIGRANTS 
Aalandslid, 
2008 
Refugees poorer 
outcomes than other 
immigrants 
Adaptation; Length of 
residence correlates with better 
outcomes 
Norway All; from 
primarily 
Vietnam, Iraq 
and Iran 
Bevelander, 
2011 
Resettled refugees 
have poorer outcomes 
than asylum claimants 
and family reunion 
immigrants 
Selection processes for 
immigration (e.g. self-selection 
or UNHCR selection) and pre-
existing networks 
Sweden All 
Bevelander, 
2009 
Resettled refugees 
have lower employment 
rates and self-
employment rates than 
asylum claimants and 
family reunion 
immigrants 
  Sweden All 
Cobb-Clark 
and Khoo, 
2006 
Refugee-
humanitarian migrants 
have lower labour 
market participation and 
higher unemployment 
levels than other 
migrants 
Range of barriers Australia Refugee-
humanitarian 
migrants 
Connor 
2010, Hugo 
2010 
"Refugee gap" after 
determinates for 
disadvantage are 
controller for, refugee-
humanitarian settlers 
have poorer labour 
market outcomes than 
other migrant and non-
migrant groups 
  Australia, 
US, and in 
general 
Generalisation 
from research 
Cortes 
2004, Connor 
2010 
Refugees in the US 
have the same likelihood 
of employment as other 
immigrants to the US, 
but significantly lower 
occupational status and 
earnings 
  US All 
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Hiebert, 
2002 
pre-Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 
(pre-IRPA), refugees 
fare better on some 
measure of employment 
earnings than family 
class immigrants 
  Canada All 
Hiebert 
2009 (qtd in 
Hydman 2011) 
Refugees have lower 
labour force 
participation and higher 
welfare usage but 
exhibit resilence in the 
labour market (e.g. 
earnings), only some 
gaps 
Enriched set of settlement 
services help 
Vancouver, 
Canada 
All - Resettled 
refugees not 
separated from 
refugees 
recognised in 
Canada 
Hugo, 2011 Refugees poorer 
outcomes than other 
immigrants 
Settle in places with high 
unemployments, better 
outcomes for second 
generation migrants 
Australia All 
Yu et al., 
2007 
Average 
employment rate at 6 
months and 2 years and 
average earnings are 
lower for refugees than 
for all other immigrants 
groups. 
Population characteristics; 
years with high percentage of 
highly-educated refugees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina do better 
Canada All 
Duleep et 
al., 2001 (qtd in 
Siraj, 2007) 
Comparing 
"Indochinese" 
(Vietnamese,Cambodian 
& Laotian) refugees to 
Thai, Indian, Korean, 
Chinese and Filipino 
economic migrants have 
lower education levels 
and lower earnings 
  US "Indochinese" 
refugees versus 
other Asian 
immigrants 
entering at the 
time 
REFUGEES POORER OUTCOMES THAN NATIVES 
Bevelander 
& Lundh, 2007 
"Like in many other 
Western European 
countries, most 
immigrant groups in 
Sweden have lower 
employment levels than 
natives." 
Yet, various refugee groups 
had a local "best" employment 
level close to or even over the 
general emploment rate for 
natives, for example: refugee 
men and women from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Chile as well 
as men from Yugoslavia and 
Iran 
Sweden All 
75 
 
Hugo, 2013 Refugee-
humanitarian settlers 
have lower labour force 
participation rates than 
Australian born, but 
performance converges 
over time and "second 
generation perform at a 
higher level" 
Obstacles included: 
"language, education, 
structural, disadvantage, and 
discrimination." Evidence that 
part of the gap explained by 
discrimination 
Australia Refugees, 
humanitarian 
settlers 
Lundborg, 
2013 
Refugees have poorer 
employment outcomes 
than natives 
Certain populations have 
worse initial conditions due to 
more discrimination of certain 
cultural and ethnical 
backgrounds 
Sweden Refugees 
identified by 
country of origin 
Samuel, 
1984 
Refugees & 
immigrants poorer 
outcomes than natives 
Outcomes influenced by 
labour market conditions, 
language, proficiency, 
sympathy by the population by 
refugees, support by co-ethnics 
& individual adaptability 
Canada 400,000 
refugees (over 25 
years), primarily 
Hungarians, 
Czechoslovaks, 
Ugandan Asians, 
Chileans, and 
Indochinese 
Source: Retrieved from Ott (2013) 
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Annex 5– Interview with António Jorge Portas 
 
 
1- Bom dia Dr. Jorge. Antes de mais pedia-lhe que me descrevesse o seu cargo 
na REPER. 
R: Desempenho o cargo de Conselheiro para a área JAI (Justiça e Assuntos 
Internos) desde Setembro de 2010, tendo acompanhado ao longo do tempo as 
matérias relativas à migração legal, imigração irregular e retorno, asilo e vistos. A 
um conselheiro nestas áreas políticas compete, antes de tudo, apoiar o 
Representante Permanente a defender da melhor forma os interesses nacionais nas 
reuniões do Coreper II, onde os assuntos são debatidos, antes de passarem para o 
nível ministerial do Conselho. Em termos gerais, um conselheiro representa e 
defende os interesses nacionais, tendo de negociar com os representantes dos 
outros EM e Comissão as propostas de medidas (essencialmente legislativas) que 
são apresentadas nos diferentes grupos de trabalho competentes. Num momento 
em que as Presidências têm vindo a assentar cada vez mais os seus esforços 
negociais em trabalho “Brussels based”, os Conselheiros têm hoje um importante e 
difícil papel de discussão das numerosas propostas legislativas, substituindo-se, 
muitas vezes, aos peritos nas matérias. 
 
2- De que grupos de trabalho do Conselho da União Europeia é que o Jorge está 
responsável, representando assim os interesses da República Portuguesa? 
R: Como refiro na resposta à questão anterior, tenho acompanhado ao longo 
do tempo as matérias relativas à migração legal, imigração irregular e retorno, 
asilo e vistos. Atenta a crise migratória e a pressão legislativa que se faz sentir 
desde 2015, em particular na política de asilo, ultimamente tenho 
acompanhado mais, e praticamente em exclusivo, as negociações do pacote 
asilo, composto por sete propostas legislativas, quer ao nível do grupo de 
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trabalho competente quer ao nível das inúmeras e frequentes reuniões de 
conselheiros JAI. 
 
3- O Jorge diria que recentemente os estados membros estão a adotar políticas 
de asilo mais conservadoras?  
 
R: Duvido que o termo “conservadoras” seja o mais adequado neste contexto. 
Diria, mais “restritivas”. É mais fácil sermos generosos quando temos a 
certeza que a nossa generosidade não nos colocará numa situação em que 
poderíamos ter dificuldade de corresponder ao que nos fosse pedido. Com os 
Estados, acontece exatamente a mesma coisa. Quando, em 2015, os EM se 
confrontaram com uma enorme vaga migratória composta por imigrantes 
económicos, refugiados de guerra e requerentes de asilo, a qual não teriam 
capacidade para acolher e integrar facilmente, em muitos EM as respetivas 
classes dirigentes concluíram que a melhor forma de lidar com o fenómeno 
migratório e gerir as consequências da pressão migratória seria a adoção de 
medidas mais restritivas, para tentar dar resposta aos anseios e receios, 
fundados ou não, da opinião pública. Podem aqui referir-se alguns dos EM do 
leste, em particular o grupo de Visegrado composto pela PL, HU, SK e CZ, 
mas também alguns EM do Norte da Europa, em que a DK será o exemplo 
mais evidente. 
4- Na sua opinião, por que motivo se deve esta recente tendência?  
 
R: As imagens da crise migratória de 2015, que se prolongou por 2016, 
mudaram a Europa. Não foi apenas por causa da crise migratória, mas 
também em grande medida, que se verificou o resultado no referendo sobre o 
brexit no UK. Não terá sido apenas por causa da crise migratória, mas 
também por causa da crise migratória, que em vários EM se começou a 
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verificar um acentuar de viragem em direcção a políticas claramente 
restritivas da imigração, extremistas e populistas, como é o caso, apenas a 
título de mero exemplo, na PL, HU, AT, IT, e o crescimento dos partidos 
políticos da extrema-direita radical em alguns outros, como é o caso mais 
paradigmático da Alemanha. Por outro lado, é verdade que o enorme afluxo 
de refugiados e imigrantes nos anos de 2015 e 2016 colocaram os EM perante 
desafios enormes em matéria de integração, havendo quem defenda que antes 
de serem admitidas mais pessoas, haveria necessidade de criar condições de 
integração para aqueles que já se encontram no território dos EM. 
 
5- Existe alguma política comum de integração de refugiados na UE ou cabe a 
cada estado membro defini-la internamente?  
        
R:  Não existe uma política comum de integração na UE. Nos termos do artigo 
79(4) do TFUE, o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho, deliberando de acordo com o 
processo legislativo ordinário, podem estabelecer medidas para incentivar e 
apoiar a ação dos Estados-Membros destinada a fomentar a integração dos 
nacionais de países terceiros que residam legalmente no seu território, excluindo-
se qualquer harmonização das disposições legislativas e regulamentares dos 
Estados-Membros. Neste quadro, a Comissão a preentou em 2016 um Plano de 
Ação para a integração de nacionais de países terceiros e o Conselho aprovou 
Conclusões sobre o mesmo tema, que poderá encontrar nos portais da UE. Quer 
isto dizer que os EM mantêm a respectiva competência nacional em matéria de 
integração de cidadãos nacionais de países terceiros, sejam refugiados ou 
imigrantes económicos, tendo a UE (Comissão) apenas um papel de coordenação 
das medidas. No caso de se estar a referir a regras de acesso ao processo de asilo, 
condições de acolhimento de requerentes de asilo, direitos dos requerentes de 
protecção internacional e beneficiários, essa sim é uma área da competência 
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partilhada da UE e EM, existindo um conjunto de instrumentos legislativos 
(conhecido por “Sistema Europeu Comum de Asilo”) que definem regras comuns 
que os EM estão obrigado a respeitar. Neste momento, encontra-se em negociação 
uma reforma do  “Sistema Europeu Comum de Asilo”, com debates intensos sobre 
sete propostas legislativas: Regulamento Procedimentos de protecção 
internacional (visa revogar e substituir a directiva 2013/32), Regulamento 
“Qualificação” (visa revogar e substituir a directiva 2011/95), Diretiva Condições 
de Acolhimento dos requerentes de protecção internacional (altera a directiva 
2013/33), Regulamento que cria a Agência de Asilo da UE (substitui o regulamento 
2010/439), Regulamento Dublin (altera o regulamento 2013/604), Regulamento 
Eurodac (altera o regulamento 2013/603) e Regulamento que cria um quadro de 
Reinstalação da EU. Para além da legislação da EU, onde também assume 
relevância a Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais, os EM estão obrigados ao 
cumprimento de outras obrigações internacionais, nomeadamente e em particular, 
as previstas na Convenção de Genebra de 1951 e respectivo Protocolo, relativos ao 
direito de asilo e de estatuto de refugiado, e à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos 
do Homem. Existe, assim, uma tendência, ao transformar algumas das directivas 
actualmente em vigor em regulamentos, em reduzir a margem de flexibilidade dos 
EM em matéria de regras de proteção internacional e de criação de mecanismos 
de controlo e monitorização mais apertados. 
 
6- Muito bem. Na sua opinião quais são os maiores desafios que a UE enfrenta 
agora e num futuro próximo? 
 
R: Não é fácil uma resposta, para mais minuciosa. O principal desafio que a 
EU se confronta é, quanto a mim, tentar sobreviver enquanto entidade que une 
um conjunto de EM que partilham (ou deveriam partilhar) princípios básicos e 
regras fundamentais inerentes a Estados de Direito democráticos. Num 
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contexto político muito difícil, com necessidade de adaptação ao Brexit e de 
reacção ao crescimento de políticas nacionais extremistas e xenófobas, a UE 
enfrenta, a curto prazo, em particular, três grandes desafios: reforço da União 
Económica e Monetária, aprovação de um novo Quadro Financeiro Plurianual 
para 2021 a 2028 (já sem o UK enquanto contribuinte líquido e com alteração 
de prioridades políticas) e a reforma do sistema de asilo. Na  reforma do 
sistema de asilo e a criação de um sistema reforçado de gestão de migração 
legal  não será fácil acolher políticas nacionais hoje tão diferentes, onde à 
obrigação de cumprimento das obrigações internacionais em matéria de 
protecção internacional e respeito dos direitos fundamentais - há bem pouco 
tempo tido como inquestionáveis e indiscutíveis mas que hoje se sente 
necessidade de relembrar se confrontam as exigências, de alguns EM, no 
reforço dos controlos das fronteiras externas, como medida (quase)  exclusiva 
de gestão dos fluxos migratórios. Será, por isso, muito difícil chegar a um 
acordo sobre a reforma legislativa em curso, na qual, recorde-se, o Parlamento 
Europeu, enquanto co-legislador, tem também um papel a desempenhar. 
 
7-  Muito obrigado pelo seu tempo e por todo o apoio que me deu ao longo do 
meu estágio na REPER. Ficar-lhe-ei eternamente grato. 
 
 
